Economics of export subsidies under costly and imperfect enforcement by Giannakas, Konstantinos
 
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003
 
The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
 
, 47:4, pp. 541–562
 




Economics of export subsidies K. Giannakas
 







The present paper builds on the published literature on agricultural policy ana-
lysis under costly and imperfect enforcement by introducing enforcement costs
and misrepresentation into the economic analysis of export subsidies. Speciﬁ-
cally, the present paper examines the economic causes of cheating on export sub-
sidies and the consequences of enforcement costs and misrepresentation for the
welfare effects and the transfer efﬁciency of this policy instrument. Policy design
and implementation is modelled as a sequential game between a government
that designs and enforces the policy and the recipients of the payments. Two
alternative policy implementation scenarios are considered. In the ﬁrst scenario,
export subsidies are paid to private trading ﬁrms while in the second scenario
subsidies are paid directly to the producers of the subsidised commodity. Analy-
tical results show that the introduction of enforcement costs and cheating changes
the welfare effects of export subsidies and their efﬁciency in redistributing income
to producers. The analysis also shows that, contrary to what is traditionally
believed, the incidence of export subsidies depends on the group that is subsidised
to export the surplus quantity – the way the policy is implemented. The results
provide additional support for the contention that the economic consequences of
cheating are highly policy-speciﬁc. Finally, the analysis reveals that when the gov-
ernment faces restrictions on either the volume or the value of export subsidies,
cheating reduces the distortionary effects of the policy on international markets.





Governments have traditionally used a variety of policy instruments to
redistribute income in the economy. Export subsidies are a well-utilised
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the subsidised commodity beneﬁt from the increased market price while
consumers and taxpayers are the interest groups that fund the transfer to
producers (Gardner 1987).
The government transfers through export subsidies, however, create an
incentive for the recipient of the subsidies to misrepresent the quantity and/
or the quality of the exported commodity and collect payments for phan-
tom output and/or for higher quality product than that actually exported.
This is especially true for the European Union (EU) where eligibility for
most income transfer programs requires those entitled to payments to self-
report the variable on which the payments are based.
In agriculture for instance, where export subsidies have been extensively
applied, the Common Agricultural Policy’s costs from ‘real fraud – the
export subsidies claimed on goods that do not exist, subsidies claimed on
goods of higher quality than those actually exported or processed, the sub-
sidies paid out for nonexistent olive trees, for the grubbing of phantom
orchards, for the retiring of imaginary cows – … account for up to 10 per
cent of the 36 billion ECU a year laid out on agricultural support …’




 Whereas there is no similar ﬁgure available (to us)
for the USA, the existence of a US Department of Agriculture (USDA)
‘hotline’ where cases of ‘fraud’ related to the ‘submission of false claims/
statements’ can be reported indicates that cheating and misrepresentation
are not unknown to US policy makers (USDA Ofﬁce of Inspector General
2000).
Despite the incentive for and the incidence of cheating on export sub-




Even though there might be reasons for the employment of export subsidies other than
income redistribution (such as increasing the domestic country’s  share of the world market
or the provision of strategic advantage to domestic ﬁrms/oligopolists of the subsidised
commodity (Brander and Spencer 1985; Itoh and Kiyono 1987; Helpman and Krugman
1989), central in this analysis is the presumption that the sole purpose of government














27 billion in total subsidy expenditures by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) coun-
tries between 1995 and 1998 followed by Switzerland (5 per cent), the USA (1.5 per cent)




. 2001). It should be noted that, in addition to direct
export subsidies there are also the so-called ‘implicit export subsidies’ resulting from the
market effects of the operation of state-trading enterprises (STE) that expand exports like
the Australian Wheat Board, the Canadian Wheat Board, and the New Zealand Dairy
Board (for the trade and welfare effects of STE see Ackerman and Dixit (1999)). The analysis
of these implicit export subsidies is outside the scope of the present paper. 
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economics literature. The traditional welfare analysis of the policy takes
place under the assumption that the agents involved in the export of the sub-
sidised commodity comply completely with the provisions of the policy, or
alternatively, that policy enforcement is perfect and costless. In such a world,
when the trading sector is perfectly competitive, it makes no difference
whether the subsidies are paid directly to producers or to the traders of the
commodity; competitive pressures result in the transfer of payments to pro-
ducers of the subsidised commodity (Gardner 1987).
Few studies have incorporated misrepresentation or cheating in theoretical
agricultural policy analysis. Giannakas and Fulton develop a game-theoretic
approach to examine the effects of misrepresentation and cheating on the eco-
nomics of production quotas (Giannakas and Fulton 2003a,b), decoupled
payments (Giannakas and Fulton 2002), output subsidies (Giannakas and
Fulton 2000a), and the normative efﬁciency ranking of output quotas, deﬁ-
ciency payments, and a combination of quotas and subsidies (Giannakas
and Fulton 2000b) in the context of a closed economy. A result of these studies
is that the economic consequences of cheating are highly policy-speciﬁc.
For instance, while the efﬁciency in redistribution of both decoupled





incorporation of enforcement costs and misrepresentation into the analysis
of these policies reduces the transfer efﬁciency of decoupled payments
and may increase the transfer efﬁciency of output subsidies relative to the
perfect and costless enforcement case considered in the traditional agri-
cultural policy analysis. On the contrary, the transfer efﬁciency of output
quotas falls with the extent of violation of the quota limits and it is always
lower than that under perfect and costless enforcement; that is, the intro-
duction of enforcement costs and cheating results in supply restrictions
being less efﬁcient means of income redistribution than is traditionally
believed.
The objective of the present study is to extend the literature on efﬁcient
income redistribution under costly and imperfect enforcement by introduc-
ing enforcement costs and misrepresentation into the theoretical analysis of
export subsidies. To keep the analysis general, the case-speciﬁc complica-
tions of particular programs are not considered in the present paper.
Instead, the present paper examines the economic causes of cheating on a




The efﬁciency in redistribution (or transfer efﬁciency) links the social costs of market
intervention to the surplus transferred to producers. The lower the welfare losses associated
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present paper then examines the consequences of enforcement costs and
misrepresentation for the welfare of the interest groups and the efﬁciency of
the policy in redistributing income to producers. The present paper ana-
lyses the incidence of export subsidies in the presence of quantity and quality
misrepresentation under two alternative policy implementation scenarios.
In the ﬁrst scenario (which is the most prevalent as far as implementation




), export subsidies are
paid to private trading ﬁrms while in the second scenario subsidies are paid
directly to the producers of the subsidised commodity.
Following Giannakas and Fulton (2000a,b; 2002; 2003a,b), the design
and implementation of the stylised export subsidy scheme is modelled as
a sequential game between a government that designs and enforces the
policy, and the group that is subsidised to export the excess domestic
supply. The objective functions of the agents involved (i.e., government,
private trading ﬁrms and producers) are assumed to be common knowledge.
The government moves ﬁrst and determines the levels of policy intervention
and enforcement. Once the government decisions are announced, the recipi-
ents of the subsidies (i.e., private trading ﬁrms or producers) decide on the
quantity to trade and the quantity on which subsidy claims are made.
All formulations of the sequential game developed in the present paper
are solved using backwards induction (Gibbons 1992). The problem of the
subsidised agent is considered ﬁrst and the solution to the government’s pro-
blem determines the (subgame perfect) equilibrium enforcement and misrep-
resentation. While the present paper considers the economic consequences of
misrepresentation in the context of a large exporting country, the relevance
of the analysis for a small open economy is discussed throughout the text.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 examines the causes and
consequences of output misrepresentation when export subsidies are paid
to private exporting ﬁrms. Section 3 analyses the effect of enforcement
costs and output misrepresentation on the incidence of subsidies paid to
producers. Section 4.1 extends the analysis to the cases of quality misrepres-
entation by private traders and producers. The case where penalties are
endogenous to policy makers is considered in Section 4.2. Section 5 discusses
the implications of misrepresentation for the trade effects of export sub-




The analysis thus pertains to cases where receipt of export subsidies requires an appli-
cation (self-reporting) by those eligible to payments and does not apply to implicit export




All major export subsidy programs in the EU and the USA involve subsidies being
paid to private exporters. 
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2. Export subsidies paid to private trading ﬁrms
2.1 Optimal quantity misrepresentation by the trading ﬁrms
 
When an export subsidy scheme where private trading ﬁrms are subsidised
to dispose of the excess domestic quantity is in effect, the exporting ﬁrms
might ﬁnd it optimal to cheat on the program by misrepresenting the quantity
of the commodity they export. By misrepresenting the quantity exported the
trading ﬁrms may collect government payments for nonexistent quantities
of the subsidised commodity. The possibility of cheating on export subsidies
arises from an informational constraint, namely; exporters’ actions cannot
be directly observed – they can only be veriﬁed through costly auditing.
Assuming a perfectly competitive structure of the trading sector where
ﬁrms know the export subsidy, the per unit penalty in case they are caught mis-
representing the exported quantity, and the probability of being detected
cheating, the problem of the representative ﬁrm can be seen as decision
making under uncertainty. In the simplest case, consider a risk-neutral ﬁrm
that decides on the quantity to export and the quantity to misrepresent.














 is the quantity reported as eligible for






 (i.e., the total quantity reported as



























the world price of the subsidised commodity (i.e., the price received by the






 is the domestic price of the exported










) represents the trading costs for the exporting ﬁrm (such as the costs
of moving the commodity from the producers, the costs of storing it, and the




 is the penalty paid per unit of mis-



















The model in equation (1) can be modiﬁed to include risk aversion of the representative trad-





























































































































































negative. In terms of output misrepresentation, risk aversion results
in reduced cheating relative to the case where risk neutrality is assumed. Cheating also falls











incorporated into the representative ﬁrm’s objective function. Even though both risk averse
behaviour and private costs from cheating change the results quantitatively, the qualitative
nature of the results in the present study remain unaffected.
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Following Giannakas and Fulton (2000a,b, 2002, 2003a,b), the detection
probability is assumed to be a linear function of the quantity misrepre-




























. This formulation of the detection probability
captures the idea that the more a ﬁrm cheats, the greater is the likelihood


















, is strictly positive and is assumed





the observability of ﬁrms’ actions by third parties and the social attitudes
towards cheating: the degree to which the third party that observes the
illegal behaviour will report it to policy enforcers.
The problem speciﬁed in equation (1) is a simple, static optimisation
problem with a nonequality constraint. The nonequality constraint requires
that the quantity misrepresented should be non-negative – proﬁt-maximising
ﬁrms should not under-report the quantity that is eligible for payments.
Solving the optimality (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for qx shows the standard
result that the quantity exported is determined by the equality of the unit
price received by exporters (i.e., the export subsidy, v, plus the price the trad-
ing ﬁrm can sell the commodity for in the world market, pw) with the marginal
costs incurred by traders (i.e., the marginal cost of acquiring the com-
modity, pd, plus the marginal cost of trading the commodity, c′(qx)); that is,
8
pw + v = pd + c′(qx). (2)
Regarding the quantity misrepresented, qm, the optimality conditions
indicate that cheating decisions depend on the policy variable v and the
enforcement parameters δ 0 and ρ. Speciﬁcally, so long as   the
optimal qm equals:
(3)
7 In the context of the present paper, audits are regarded as random; policy makers
determine and announce the proportion of ﬁrms that will be investigated and every ﬁrm
faces the same audit probability.
8 Note that the disconnect between the trading and the cheating decisions of the ﬁrm is
a result of the detection probability being a function of the quantity misrepresented. An
alternative formulation of the detection probability could involve δ being a function of the
relative misrepresented quantity, for example,  . In such a case, the trading
decisions of the ﬁrm are no longer independent from its cheating decisions. Given that both
formulations are equally plausible, we have chosen the one that enhances the tractability of
our analysis.
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and the aggregate quantity misrepresented, Qm, is given by:
(4)
where N is the number of private trading ﬁrms exporting the subsidised com-
modity and  .
Equation (4) indicates that, similar to the cases of output subsidies (Giannakas
and Fulton 2000a) and decoupled payments (Giannakas & Fulton 2002), the
extent of misrepresentation falls with a reduction in the subsidy payment
and/or an increase in the detection probability and per unit penalty parameters
 then the expected
costs from cheating outweigh the expected beneﬁts and the trading ﬁrms
will ﬁnd it optimal to truthfully reveal their exported quantity (i.e., Qm = 0).
2.2 Incidence of export subsidies paid to private trading ﬁrms
When the combination of the policy variable and the enforcement para-
meters is such that cheating occurs (i.e., Qm > 0), the traditional analysis of
the policy instrument fails to consider the private trading ﬁrms’ aggregate
expected beneﬁts from misrepresentation. In the current setting, these bene-
ﬁts to trading ﬁrms are given by EBc = [(1 − δ)v − δρ]Qm and constitute a
direct (decoupled) transfer from taxpayers.
Furthermore, the assumption of ‘perfect and costless policy enforcement’
results in the negligence of the monitoring and enforcement costs, Φ(δ0),
that arise whenever the audit probability, δ0, is positive. These costs are
essentially transaction costs associated with policy implementation. They
are assumed to be a non-decreasing function of δ0 ( i.e.,  Φ′(δ0) ≥ 0,
Φ″(δ0) ≥ 0), and should be included into both the budgetary costs and the
welfare losses from the program.
Speciﬁcally, the welfare effects of the policy instrument when subsidies
are paid to private trading ﬁrms and cheating occurs are as follows. An
export subsidy scheme increases the price of the commodity in the country
that subsidises its exports (i.e., price pd in equation (1)). The higher market
price causes producer surplus to increase and consumer welfare to fall.
When the exporting country faces a downward sloping export demand
curve, disposal of the increased domestic surplus into the world market
requires the world price of the commodity to fall. The reduction in the
world price because of export subsidies results in welfare transfers to
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The cost of subsidising the exported quantity (i.e., vQx) is borne by tax-
payers. Taxpayers also fund the transfer to producers when cheating occurs
(i.e., EBc) as well as the monitoring and enforcement costs of the program,
Φ(δ0). More speciﬁcally, the taxpayer costs when export subsidies are paid
to private trading ﬁrms equal (1 + d )[vQx + EBc + Φ(δ0)], and are increased
relative to the ‘perfect and costless enforcement’ case by an amount equal
to (1 + d )[EBc + Φ(δ0)], where d is the marginal deadweight loss from taxa-
tion (Fullerton 1991; Ballard and Fullerton 1992).
The aforementioned increase in taxpayer costs causes the deadweight
welfare loss (DWL) from export subsidies also to increase. Speciﬁcally,
when enforcement is costly and cheating occurs the DWL from the program
exceeds that under ‘perfect and costless enforcement’ by an amount equal
to dEBc + (1 + d )Φ(δ0).
9
Since, for any positive subsidy v, output misrepresentation increases the
deadweight losses from the program while having no effect on producer
surplus, the efﬁciency of export subsidies in redistributing income to
producers (i.e., the ratio of the welfare losses from the program over the
increase in producer surplus, DWL/∆PS), falls with cheating. Put in a different
way, when enforcement is costly and exporting ﬁrms cheat on the program,
the transfer efﬁciency of export subsidies is lower than is traditionally
believed. The transfer efﬁciency of export subsidies under costly and imper-
fect enforcement is given by:
(5)
where the superscripts pce and cie_f stand for ‘perfect and costless enforce-
ment’ and ‘costly and imperfect enforcement of subsidies paid to private
ﬁrms’, respectively.
2.3 Optimal enforcement by the government
Facing export subsidies as income redistributional measures, the objective
of the government can be seen as the implementation of (any) income
9 Note that while the analysis focuses on the welfare consequences of cheating on export
subsidies in the large country case, the main results of this section apply for a small open
economy as well. More speciﬁcally, in the case of a small open economy export subsidies
have no effect on the world price of the commodity in question. Since the world price
remains unaffected, both taxpayer costs and DWL from export subsidies are reduced rela-
tive to the large country case by the surplus transfer to foreigners adjusted to account for
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redistribution in the most efﬁcient manner. In other words, the problem of
the government can be seen as the determination of the enforcement level that
maximises the efﬁciency of the policy instrument in transferring income
to producers. Given that penalties are usually set by the legal system, the
government can be seen as seeking δ0 that minimises  . Since, however,
for any given subsidy v, the level of enforcement has no effect on the welfare
of producers and consumers of the subsidised commodity, minimising
 is equivalent to minimising the welfare losses from enforcement
and cheating: CC = dEBc + (1 + d)Φ(δ0).
Assuming, without loss of generality, that   (where ψ is a
strictly positive scalar depending on the number of the trading ﬁrms
exporting the subsidised commodity),
10 the problem of the government
can be written as:
(6)
where all variables are as previously deﬁned.
Optimisation of the government’s problem yields the following ﬁrst order
condition for a minimum:
(7)
Equation (7) indicates that the optimal audit probability is determined by the
equality of the marginal costs of monitoring and enforcement, MCe = (1 + d)ψδ0,
with the marginal beneﬁts from investigation,  . The
MBe include beneﬁts from penalties collected on detected misrepresentation
and also beneﬁts from induced compliance of the ﬁrms to the program
provisions (i.e., reduction in the surplus transferred from taxpayers to private
10 Obviously, the greater the number of trading ﬁrms, the greater the costs associated
with any positive audit probability. For instance, the costs of raising the audit probability
to, say, 50 per cent are quite different when there are 50 ﬁrms in the market than when
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exporting ﬁrms and thus, reduction in the DWL from taxation). Solving
the ﬁrst order condition in equation (7) for δ0 gives the optimal audit pro-
bability as:
. (8)
Substituting   into equation (5), we get the equilibrium level of output
misrepresentation as:
. (9)
Equations (8) and (9) show that as long as monitoring compliance is costly
(i.e., when ψ > 0), the optimal audit probability is below the level that com-
pletely deters cheating,  . The greater are the monitoring costs,
the lower is the equilibrium δ0, and the greater is the level of misrepresen-
tation by the private trading ﬁrms.
11
The efﬁciency gains from not completely deterring output misrepresenta-
tion when enforcement is costly can be seen graphically in the interest
groups’ surplus space. Figure 1 shows the Surplus Transformation Curves
(STC) for export subsidies under the different scenarios considered in this
section.
12 More speciﬁcally, STC
nc is the relevant STC when enforcement is
costly and cheating is completely deterred by setting δ0 equal to  . STC
cie_f
represents the situation where (costly) enforcement is at its optimal level
(i.e., δ0 =   in equation (8)), while the curve labelled STC
pce corresponds
11 Note that while the analysis assumes increasing marginal enforcement costs, the mar-
ginal costs from enforcement can in fact be constant (e.g., MCe = (1 + d)ψ). Whereas the
nature of the monitoring cost function affects the level of optimal enforcement, the qual-
itative nature of the results remains unaffected – the greater are the enforcement costs, the
lower is the optimal enforcement.
12 A surplus transformation curve depicts the trade off between producer surplus and the sur-
plus of the other interest groups (i.e., consumers, taxpayers and private trading ﬁrms in this case)
under an export subsidy (Gardner 1983). The slope of the STC, denoted as  ,
is the marginal rate of surplus transformation. It shows the efﬁciency of the policy in redistributing
income to producers at the margin; how much of an extra dollar raised by other interest groups
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to a situation where enforcement is perfect and costless and is the STC pro-
posed by the traditional analysis of the policy (Gardner 1983; 1987).
Figure 1 shows that STC
nc lies underneath STC
cie_ f which, in turn, lies
underneath STC
pce everywhere to the left of E – the point of no-intervention.
The horizontal distance between the STC reﬂects the difference in DWL
associated with a given surplus transfer to producers of the subsidised com-
modity. Speciﬁcally, the horizontal difference between STC
cie_ f and STC
pce
equals dEBc + (1 + d)Φ()   w hile the distance between STC
nc and STC
pce is
given by (1  + d)Φ( ); the resource costs required to completely deter
cheating. Since  ,   and dEBc increase with an increase in v, the greater
is the level of intervention (i.e., the further left from E we move), the
greater is the horizontal distance between the STC, and the greater are the
efﬁciency losses from cheating by the private trading ﬁrms.
3. Export subsidies paid to producers
Consider next the situation where subsidies are paid directly to the producers
of the subsidised commodity. Maintaining similar assumptions regarding
the policy variable, the enforcement parameters, and the objective of the
government, this section of the present paper derives the equilibrium enforce-
ment and cheating and examines the welfare effects and the transfer efﬁ-




Figure 1 Surplus transformation curves for export subsidies with misrepresentation
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Similar to the case where subsidies are paid to private trading ﬁrms,
when export subsidies are paid to producers of the supported commodity
13
there are economic incentives for producers to cheat and collect govern-
ment payments on phantom output. The problem of the representative
producer is similar to that described in equation (1) and the market and
welfare effects of the policy are mainly those discussed in Sections 2.1 and
2.2. The difference in this case is that, when cheating occurs, the expected
beneﬁts from misrepresentation accrue to producers rather than to private
trading ﬁrms; that is, cheating by producers increases producer surplus by
an amount equal to EBc. The implication of this is that the efﬁciency in
redistribution of export subsidies when those are paid to producers is given
by:
(10)
where the superscript cie_p stands for ‘costly and imperfect enforcement of
subsidies paid to producers.’
3.1 Optimal enforcement by the government
Similar to the case where export subsidies are paid to trading ﬁrms, it
is assumed that the objective of the government is to transfer income
to producers in the most efﬁcient way; that is, to determine the level of
policy enforcement that maximises the efﬁciency of the transfers to pro-
ducers. Maintaining that penalties are set elsewhere in the legal system,
the problem of the government can be seen as the determination of the
audit probability δ0  that minimises the DWL  per dollar transferred to
producers. More speciﬁcally, the problem of the government can be written
as:
(11)
13 Producers can export the excess domestic supply employing trading services supplied
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where   with  K being the number of producers of the subsidised com-
modity. All other variables are as previously deﬁned.
The problem of the government speciﬁed in equation (11) is a simple,
static optimisation problem with both equality and nonequality con-
straints. The equality constraint reﬂects producers’ best response function,
while the nonequality constraint requires the optimal audit probability to
be non-negative. Solving the optimality (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions shows
that the optimal δ0 depends on the efﬁciency of export subsidies relative to
lump-sum transfers under ‘perfect and costless enforcement.’ Speciﬁcally, if
export subsidies are less efﬁcient income redistributional measures than
lump-sum transfers to producers when policy enforcement is perfect and
costless (i.e., the usual case, see Gardner (1983; 1987), Alston and Hurd
(1990), Alston et al. (1993)), the transfer efﬁciency of the policy is maxim-
ised when policy enforcers do not investigate the producers.
Put in a different way, if   the optimal δ 0 equals zero,
14
(12)
and the equilibrium (total) output misrepresentation is:
. (13)
The reasoning of these results is as follows. If  , the decoupled
transfer from taxpayers to producers through cheating increases the aver-
age transfer efﬁciency of the policy – the greater are the producer beneﬁts
from cheating, the greater is the transfer efﬁciency of export subsidies.
Since both the extent of misrepresentation and the transfer to producers
through cheating are inversely related to the level of enforcement, the lower
is the level of enforcement, the greater is the transfer efﬁciency of the policy.
The efﬁciency of export subsidies in redistributing income to producers is
14 A zero audit probability does not mean that cheating goes undetected. Since δ 1  is
assumed strictly positive, a zero δ 0  means that policy enforcers will not actively spend
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maximised when policy makers spend no resources to deter misrepresenta-
tion; that is, when δ 0 = 0.
15
When δ 0 = 0 the monitoring and enforcement costs, Φ(δ0), are zero, and the
transfer efﬁciency of the policy instrument (equation 10) can be re-written as:
. (14).
Equation (14) shows that when  , the transfer efﬁciency of export
subsidies paid to producers when enforcement is costly is greater than is
traditionally believed; that is,  . The relevant STC of the
policy instrument (shown as the dashed STC
cie_p curve in ﬁgure 1) lies above
the STC proposed by the traditional analysis of export subsidies (i.e., curve
STC
pce) for any level of government intervention (i.e., everywhere to the left
of E).
The above results change when export subsidies are more efﬁcient than
lump-sum transfers to producers in a world where policy enforcement is perfect
and costless 
16 Obviously, in this case misrepresentation
15 An alternative way to rationalise the above results is as follows. Assume that the gov-
ernment wants to transfer some given surplus to producers and uses export subsidies to
achieve the desired income redistribution. When cheating occurs, the total transfer to pro-
ducers consists of the transfer through the market effects of the policy (i.e., increased price
and production) and the (decoupled) transfer through cheating. The lower is the level of
policy enforcement, the greater is misrepresentation and the greater is the transfer to pro-
ducers through cheating. The increased transfer through cheating means that the govern-
ment can reduce the subsidy payment so that the total transfer to producers (transfer
through the market plus transfer through cheating) is the desired one. Reduced enforce-
ment means reduced monitoring costs while reduced subsidy payments imply reduced
resource costs from misallocation of productive resources (and reduced transfer to foreign-
ers in a case where the exporting country faces a downward sloping export demand curve).
Reduced enforcement costs and distortionary costs of market intervention means reduced
DWL associated with a given transfer to producers and increased transfer efﬁciency of the
policy instrument. The transfer efﬁciency is maximised when enforcement is zero. Put in
a different way, the efﬁciency of the transfers to producers increases with cheating since
misrepresentation allows the government to substitute distortionary transfers through the
market with (more efﬁcient) decoupled transfers through cheating.
16 In order for export subsidies to be more efﬁcient than lump-sum transfers under per-
fect and costless enforcement, the following conditions should be met: (i) a relatively small
part of domestic production is exported (so that the major part of the transfer to producers
originates from domestic consumers); (ii) the domestic demand and supply curves are very
inelastic (so that the DWL from consumption and production distortions are low); and (iii)
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reduces the average transfer efﬁciency of export subsidies since it generates
relatively less efﬁcient transfers to producers who cheat on the program. In
view of this fact, policy makers will always ﬁnd it optimal to spend resources
to deter misrepresentation (i.e.,  ). However, policy enforcement will
be imperfect because of the resource costs of monitoring producers’ actions
. Since policy enforcement is imperfect, some cheating
will occur and the relevant STC for export subsidies paid to producers
when   will lie in between STC
nc and STC
pce everywhere to the left
of E in ﬁgure 1.
4. Extensions of the model
4.1 Quality misrepresentation
The framework of analysis developed in the previous two sections can also
be used to examine the effects of quality (rather than quantity) misrepre-
sentation when an export subsidy scheme is in place. In this case, private
trading ﬁrms and/or producers misrepresent the quality of the exported
commodity to collect payments on higher value product than what is
actually exported. Interestingly, the main results of the analysis remain
unaffected (see Appendix).
Speciﬁcally, when subsidies are paid to private trading ﬁrms enforcement
will be imperfect (i.e.,  ) and ﬁrms will ﬁnd it optimal to cheat
on the program by misrepresenting the quality of the commodity they
export. Quality misrepresentation results in surplus transfers from taxpayers
to private trading ﬁrms and DWL. Because of the increased resource costs
associated with cheating, quality misrepresentation by the private exporting
ﬁrms results in efﬁciency losses relative to the ‘perfect and costless enforce-
ment’ case; the relevant STC will be similar to the STC
cie_f shown in ﬁgure 1
and will lie underneath STC
pce for every positive level of intervention.
On the other hand, when subsidies are paid to the producers of the re-
gulated commodity, quality misrepresentation results in decoupled transfers
from taxpayers to producers and increased transfer efﬁciency of the policy.
The relevant STC is similar to STC
cie_p in ﬁgure 1 and lies above STC
pce for
every positive level of intervention; quality misrepresentation by producers
increases the transfer efﬁciency of export subsidies.
δ 0 0 *   >
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4.2 Endogenous penalties
The previous analysis and results are based on the assumption that penalties
are set by the legal system and are therefore exogenous to policy makers.
For completeness of exposition, the current section relaxes this assumption
and examines the incidence of export subsidies in an environment where
policy makers have control over both audit probability and penalties
charged on detected misrepresentation.
Assuming that there are no economic costs associated with the estab-
lishment of ﬁnes for cheating on subsidy programs, when penalties are
endogenous to policy makers policy enforcement is potentially costless.
More speciﬁcally, since both audits and penalties result in reduced cheating
, policy makers can substitute costly audits with 
costless penalties; they can set δ 0 arbitrarily close to zero and increase penalties
to the level at which misrepresentation is completely deterred. Therefore,
the reason for imperfect enforcement in the case of (quantity and quality)
misrepresentation by the private trading ﬁrms, namely, the cost of monitor-
ing ﬁrms’ actions, is no longer valid when penalties are endogenous to policy
makers.
The implication of this is that when subsidies are paid to private trad-
ers and penalties are endogenous, cheating will be completely deterred
through the establishment of (almost) zero audit probability and huge ﬁnes
on ﬁrms caught misrepresenting the quantity they export or the quality of
their exports (i.e., solving the problem of the government speciﬁed in
equation (6) with respect to both δ 0 and ρ shows that the transfer efﬁciency
of export subsidies is maximised when δ 0ρ = ∞ with limρ→∞δ0 = 0). Since
cheating is perfectly and costlessly deterred when enormous ﬁnes are
set, the welfare effects and the transfer efﬁciency of export subsidies paid to
private trading ﬁrms are those derived by the traditional policy analysis
(i.e., the relevant STC coincides with STC
pce in ﬁgure 1).  Thus, one inter-
pretation of the assumption of ‘perfect and costless enforcement’ that is
implicit in the traditional analysis of export subsidies, is that enormous
ﬁnes can be costlessly levied on ﬁrms caught cheating on the program.
The optimal combination of enforcement parameters is quite different
when subsidies are paid to the producers of the subsidised commodity.
Solving the government’s problem speciﬁed in equation (11) with respect to
both δ0 and ρ shows that, when penalties are endogenous, the transfer efﬁ-
ciency of export subsidies is maximised when δ0 = ρ = 0. The reasoning is as
follows. When both enforcement parameters equal zero (quantity and/or
quality) misrepresentation is maximised. Increased misrepresentation means
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transfer to producers through cheating, the more closely export subsidies
approximate a lump-sum transfer program and the greater is the transfer
efﬁciency of the policy instrument (the relevant STC  would lie above
STC
cie_p everywhere to the left of E in ﬁgure 1).
17
5. Implications for international trade
Before concluding the present paper it is interesting to note that, in addi-
tion to affecting the transfer efﬁciency of the policy mechanism, enforce-
ment costs and misrepresentation have important ramiﬁcations for the
trade effects of export subsidies – the consequences of the policy for the
world market of the subsidised commodity. In particular, when the govern-
ment faces restrictions on either the volume or the value of export subsidies
(as is the case with countries/members of the WTO), phantom quantities
receiving subsidies in the presence of cheating substitute one-to-one for
actual exports in the world market.
The reduced quantity exported in the presence of misrepresentation
translates into reduced distortionary effects of the policy on the world
market of the subsidised commodity. This is true irrespective of whether
subsidies are paid to trading ﬁrms or to producers. Thus, when policy
enforcement is costly and imperfect, the effect of export subsidies on the
world price and the welfare of foreign producers and consumers is less
signiﬁcant than is traditionally believed.
6. Summary and concluding remarks
The present paper builds on the published literature on agricultural policy
analysis under costly and imperfect enforcement by introducing enforce-
ment costs and misrepresentation into the theoretical analysis of export
subsidies. Analytical results on the economic consequences of cheating on
export subsidies bolster the contention that the ramiﬁcations of misrepre-
sentation and cheating on farm programs are highly policy-speciﬁc.
The introduction of enforcement costs and cheating is shown to change
the welfare effects of export subsidies and their efﬁciency in redistributing
income to producers. The analysis also reveals that, contrary to what is tradi-
tionally believed, it matters a great deal whether the subsidies are paid to
17 Notice that this result holds for the (usual) case where export subsidies are less efﬁcient
than lump-sum transfers to producers under perfect and costless enforcement. If 
misrepresentation will be completely and costlessly deterred through the establishment of
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producers or to private trading ﬁrms – when enforcement is costly, the incid-
ence of export subsidies depends on the way the policy is implemented.
Misrepresentation of the quantity exported and/or the quality of exports
results in direct transfers from taxpayers to the group that receives the sub-
sidies. Deterring misrepresentation eliminates these transfers and requires
monitoring costs that are DWL. Because of these costs, complete deter-
rence of cheating is not economically optimal even when misrepresentation
has the adverse effect of transferring income to private exporting ﬁrms. The
extra taxpayer costs that arise when enforcement is costly and subsidies are
paid to private traders (i.e., enforcement costs and transfer to exporting
ﬁrms through cheating), result in reduced efﬁciency of the policy in redis-
tributing income to producers.
On the other hand, when subsidies are paid directly to producers of the
exported commodity cheating increases the transfer efﬁciency of export
subsidies; the efﬁciency of the policy instrument in redistributing income is
greater than is traditionally believed. The reason is that the direct surplus
transfers to producers through misrepresentation result in a subsidy scheme
that approximates more closely a lump-sum transfer policy.
In addition to re-examining the transfer efﬁciency of export subsidies,
the present paper highlights the conditions under which cheating is likely to
be an issue. The section on endogenous penalties shows that if subsidies are
paid to private trading ﬁrms and it is possible to costlessly levy enormous
ﬁnes, then cheating will be effectively deterred. In short, the ability to levy
very large ﬁnes essentially means that enforcement of export subsidies paid
to private traders can be made both perfect and costless.
This result, however, raises the question as to whether disproportionate
ﬁnes for cheating on export subsidies are reasonable. The published litera-
ture on the economics of crime provides some guidance and evidence on
this issue. More speciﬁcally, it has been argued that severe punishment for
minor law violations (i.e., Becker’s (1968) ‘optimal ﬁne’ result) is neither
costless nor feasible; the punishment does not ﬁt the crime (Stigler 1970;
Carr-Hill and Stern 1977; Stern 1978; Shavell 1987; Cowell 1990).
If induced compliance through the establishment of enormous and cost-
less ﬁnes is indeed infeasible, then cheating on export subsidies will always
be an issue and should be incorporated into economic analysis. The present
paper shows that cheating has important effects on income redistribution,
effects that vary with the way the policy is implemented.
In addition to affecting the transfer efﬁciency of export subsidies,
enforcement costs and misrepresentation have important ramiﬁcations for
the trade effects of this policy instrument. In particular, when the govern-
ment faces restrictions on either the volume or the value of export sub-
sidies, phantom quantities receiving subsidies in the presence of cheatingEconomics of export subsidies 559
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substitute for actual exports in the world market. The reduced quantity
exported in the presence of cheating translates into reduced distortionary
effects of the policy on the world market of the subsidised commodity. This
is true irrespective of whether export subsidies are paid to trading ﬁrms or
to producers of the subsidised commodity.
There are limitations in the current study. As was posed at the outset, the
objective of the present study has been to introduce enforcement costs and
cheating into the economic analysis of export subsidies. Morality and
culture, though signiﬁcant determinants of individual behaviour, are not
incorporated into this analysis (for a discussion of the role of social con-
science as a general deterrent to crime see Grasmick and Green (1980)). Per-
haps most importantly, there are costs associated with cheating that have
not been considered in this analysis. Speciﬁcally, widespread cheating
(which was suggested as optimal when penalties are endogenous and sub-
sidies are paid to producers) could become epidemic, creating a culture of
dishonesty in the society and a public disrespect for both the government
and community rules (Lea et al. 1987; Cowell 1990). The expected social
costs of such a situation might outweigh the economic efﬁciency gains from
producer misrepresentation and make induced compliance the optimal
choice of policy makers. Clearly, more research is required to analyse and
better understand these issues.
Interesting extensions of this work could also include the study of
enforcement issues when export subsidies are used in conjunction with
other policies such as import barriers and various forms of supply controls,
as well as the determination of the empirical importance of cheating on
‘real world’ export subsidy schemes. Believing that the theoretical results of
the present paper can be proved useful in examining these issues, we leave
this query open to future research.
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Appendix
Quality misrepresentation
The modiﬁcation of the basic models to capture the possibility for quality
misrepresentation is quite straightforward. Suppose that the grading system
in the exporting country is structured such that there are two qualities in
the market: a low quality, l, and a high quality, h. Assume also that the
high quality produce receives a greater export subsidy that the low quality
one (i.e., v
h > v
l). In the simplest case, consider an agent trading commodity
of low quality. Similar to the case of quantity misrepresentation, the trader
is assumed to know the subsidies v
h and v
l, the per unit penalty in case it is
caught misrepresenting the quality of the product it trades, ρ, and the
detection probability,  .
The problem of the representative agent that trades low quality product
can be seen as the determination of the quantity to export,   and the
quantity of the exported commodity whose quality will misrepresent, qm.
Assuming neutrality towards risk, the problem of the trader can be written
as:
(15)
where   are the world price and the domestic market price of the
low quality product, respectively, and v
c  is the difference in subsidies




This subsidy differential reﬂects the trader’s marginal beneﬁts for misrepre-
sentation that goes undetected; the trader receives v
l for the entire quantity
of the low quality commodity that is exported, and v
c for the quantity
of exports whose quality is misrepresented, qm. Expressed differently, the
trader receives v




c) for qm. All other variables are as previously deﬁned.
Solving the optimality conditions for   and qm shows that the quantity
of the low quality produce exported by the representative trader is deter-
mined by the equality:
(16)
while, whenever  , the quantity misrepresented by the rep-
resentative trader is given by:
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(17)
Notice that the optimality conditions in equations (16) and (17) are equi-
valent to those under output misrepresentation. The rest of the analysis and
results are also similar to those derived under output misrepresentation.
Speciﬁcally, the level of enforcement that solves the problem of the govern-
ment (i.e., maximises the transfer efﬁciency of export subsidies) under quality
misrepresentation by private trading ﬁrms equals:
(18)
and the total output whose quality is misrepresented is given by:
. (19)










c   



































cc *  
(  )














c *  
( )
=
′′ + 2 1 δρ